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Medical Ethics: A Clinical Base 
David C. Thomasma, Ph.D. 
The author is a professor of medicine and philosophy and director 
of the medical humanities program at Loyola University Stritch 
School of Medicine. 
A recent mllI-symposium in the Hastings Center Report (April, 
1981) was devoted to the topic of philosophers in the clinical setting. 
This paper is intended to contribute further to the issues raised in that 
symposium, especially those raised by William Ruddick and Mark 
Siegler. 
Various views exist about the role and scope of medical ethics. 
Ingelfinger,l Shelton,2 and MacIntyre3. 4 argue that medical ethics 
is dangerous or useless. Hare,G Morgenbesser,6 and Callahan7 are 
among those who ascribe to a non-clinical view of medical ethics, 
namely, that it is a branch of philosophical ethics applied to medicine. 
Marquis8 and McKee9 question the validity of clinical medical ethics, 
though for different reasons. Siegler, 10 Siegler and Pellegrino, 11 Pelle-
grino12 and Jonsen13 all argue for the appropriateness of a clinically-
based medical ethics. The last-named all argue for thi~ position for 
practical reasons, the most important being the complexity of modern 
medicine and the fact that clinicians must be involved in setting poli-
cies which would otherwise be left to outsiders . 
The cause of such diversity lies, in part, with the newness of the 
discipline. Medical ethics has not yet proved itself. Part, too, is occa-
sioned by a different view of the aim of medical ethics. Should it aim 
at practical consideration14 . 15. 16 or should it be an application of 
more theoretical ethical labor to medicine? 17, 18 , 19.20 The process 
of applying theory to practice represents a more deductive view of 
ethics in general, and medical ethics in particular, than the tack taken 
by others who prefer to operate inductively from cases to resolutions. 
Finally, objections are raised against medical ethics on grounds that it 
usurps the decision-making requirements of medical practice without 
either sufficient knowledge 21 or proper authority.22. 23 
I shall add my voice to those calling for a clinically based medical 
ethics by attempting to clarify the confusion which exists about the 
role and presence of medical ethics in the heart of medicine. The 
problems are either posed in the literature or stem from my exper-
ience as a philosopher in the clinical setting. First I will raise three 
important objections to the clinical presence of philosopher and 
attempt to answer these objections. In the second section, I will out-
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line the tasks of a philosopher developed from experience spanning 
eight years. 
Three Objections 
The three objections which have been or can be raised to a clin-
ically based medical ethics and the presence of philosophers on rounds 
are that they constitute outside interference in professional judgment, 
that ethics can best be taught by role models in medicine who can 
infuse moral character in students, and that philosophers sell out their 
discipline by participating in clinical decisions. Each objection will be 
taken in turn. 
1) Outside Interference 
The first problem medical ethics faces is the accusation that it is a 
power grab by philosophers, theologians and lawyers who are meddle· 
some at best and counter·productive at worst. A strong sense of 
paranoia infuses the view, as medical ethics is frequently listed among 
the many other outside interferences which make professional judg-
ment in medicine so difficult today. 
Just to cite paranoia is not to answer the objection that philos· 
ophers are out of place in the clinical setting, however. In the main, if 
resistance occurs for this reason, the objection seems to vanish after 
some experience with philosophers in the clinical setting. Physicians, 
such as Victor Sidel, note that the comments of outsiders such as 
philosophers are tolerated if they help clinicians do their work. In 
addition, philosophers can assist in the formulation of policy as 
needed by the institution. 24 As the large number of programs relating 
ethics to medicine now attests, some easing of the "outsider" objec· 
tion has occurred. 25 
However, if the objection is formulated in a stronger mode, it is not 
so easy to dismiss. Ingelfinger's concerns go to the heart of the matter 
and deserve a more careful response. 26 The challenge he poses is how 
clinical ethics and all other humanities can actually improve the qual-
ity of patient care. After all, medicine is aimed at making good deci-
sions with patients and handling patient management problems. In this 
respect, clinical judgment is the guiding force of practice. 27 Given this 
pragmatic, patient-oriented approach, how can philosophers at the 
bedside be actually said to "assist" in patient care? 
Further, the objection is strengthened when one considers the qual-
ities of philosophers. They are normally argumentative, have a pen-
chant for abstract discussion, love to pose theoretical cases to illumin-
ate some obscure point, are loners, and as William Ruddick remarks, 
are more interested in truth and autonomy than in patient care. 28 
What, then, can the philosopher add to the patient care judgments 
of a morally sensitive physician? Granted the above description of 
philosophers might be a stereotype, the question still stands. 
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In response, it must be said straight off that there is no medical 
necessity for philosophers to accompany clinicians on rounds. Their 
presence depends on educational and consultative objectives. How-
ever, I will argue that their presence can contribute to improved 
patient care decisions. 
The appropriateness of having philosophers accompany physicians 
on rounds stems from the nature of medical ethics as a discipline. 
First, the proper aim of medical ethics is to contribute to the resolu-
tion of medical dilemmas. 29 Medical ethics labors which do not have 
this perspective as a goal are better labeled ethics of medicine and left 
to academic discussion. Since most of the dilemmas posed by modern 
medicine lie in making moral decisions about patient care or the dis-
tribution of care, medical ethics must have a clinical base in order to 
understand properly the realities of clinical practice, otherwise med-
ical ethics will be condemned to artificial generalizations and incompe-
tent conclusions. Therefore, while there is no medical necessity for 
philosophers to make rounds with clinicians, there is a necessIty for 
the growth of medical ethics as a discipline. 
The distinction between medical ethics and ethics of medicine is 
useful for delineating the role of medical ethics in the clinical setting. 
"Ethics of medicine" can be used to describe the more abstract discus-
sion of a range of clinically posed problems as might appear, for 
example, in a general examination· of issues in abortion or euthanasia. 
Such discussion is complex and would necessarily involve the lengthy 
examination of issues which would forestall any urgent or immediate 
decisions about patient care. In the clinical setting, such discussion is 
out of place because of the clinical imperative, making some decision 
about patient care. On the other hand, "medical ethics" can be used 
to describe a more analytic, case-oriented approach to a specific moral 
issue. Instead of a general discussion of the major issues involved in 
euthanasia, then, a specific case is discussed. The patient care objec-
tives are interlaced in the medical ethics discussion, and some action 
by the staff is recommended. Instead of an exploration and clarifica-
tion of principles, the goal of medical ethics as a clinical discipline is 
to contribute to a patient care decision in a specific clinical setting 
(the intensive care unit, for example). 
In this respect, philosophers can contribute the insights and 
language stemming from their sophisticated ethics training to clarifica-
tion of moral issues in difficult medical cases, as well as to the larger 
questions of hospital policy. In fact, if Callahan's prediction about the 
future of medical ethics debates holds true,30 philosophers familiar 
with the realities, goals, and pressures of clinical practice will be allies 
of physicians in the forthcoming discussion of social disagreements 
about moral principle. 
Second,it should also be noted that medical ethics has been devel-
oped by physicians as well as humanities professionals. As many physi-
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cians have written about moral questions in medicine as other profes-
sionals. Medical ethics is not the special province of moral philos-
ophers. Rather to achieve its aim, it must represent a true partnership 
between practicing health professionals and moralists. In order for the 
partnership to thrive, however, it must be based upon a real engage-
ment between moral thinkers and physicians regarding issues in the 
clinical setting.3 ! Even more long-range policy discussions require at 
least a modicum of medical understanding and, hopefully, an audience 
to be effective. 
Thirdly, while philosophers can and do call into question some of 
the moral aspects of medicine, it is not the role of medical ethicists to 
question medical theory, for they have no knowledge or skill in this 
area. Nor do they have the patient care responsibility assigned to 
physicians by the doctor-patient relationship. But, medical decisions 
relate to the broader goal of healing persons in which moral decisions 
do take place. 32 Clinical indicators alone do not satisfy the require-
ments of medical decisions. In fact, clinical indicators are evaluative 
and normative. The patient's values, social values, institutional values, 
and professional values also enter each decision. These can be ques-
tioned by philosophers. 
Because medical decisions are moral, i.e., involve moral values, it is 
important to clarify and rank these values, indicating which of them are 
ethical values. 33 Few physicians have the philosophical training neces-
sary for this task. One could argue further that decisions made in patient 
care without attention to the ethical values fail on two counts. First, it 
seems unlikely that such decisions can truly be said to help heal the 
person who is the patient. 34 Healing must involve the values of the 
patient or it will, in some way, denigrate the patient as a person. Cure 
of the patient may be possible, but not healing of the person . 
Secondly, such decisions, even if judged to be ethical, lack the degree 
of reflective articulation on ethics and values in general required not 
only of professional judgment but also of communication about deci-
sions with patients. Thus, Ruddick finds that the clinical presence of 
philosophers increases the consciousness of clinicians and philosophers 
about their professional assumptions and helps them both acquire a 
new degree of self-reflection. !l5 This finding is borne out in my own 
experience. 
If an authentic learning posture between clinicians and moral phil-
osophers is maintained, the role of medical ethics in medical decisions 
is clarified. The philosopher learns to reject generalizations and con-
demnations through greater sympathy with clinical closure demands, 
the pressure to make decisions, professional and personal values, insti-
tutional values, and other factors which bear upon the decision. None 
of those are available in abstract texts, as they vary from case to case, 
situation to situation, service to service, institution to institution. In 
sum, philosophers derive from clinicians the practical wisdom they so 
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often lack. 
On the other hand, physicians learn to trust the insights and even 
the recommendations of philosophers so experienced. 36 At least two 
elements are present in this trust. The first is that the philosopher 
truly understands the situation of the clinician and shares the latter's 
compassion for the patient. The second element is as important as the 
first. The trust is based upon an ability, by no means common among 
philosophers, theologians and the like, to communicate philosophical 
insights rapidly and clearly. In other words, knowledgeable persons in 
their own discipline who are able to translate insights are essential in 
the clinical setting. The aim of clinical discussions of ethical issues 
must always be targeted to the case at hand and not detract from 
patient care obligations with lengthy discourses on philosophical dis-
tinctions. It is this requirement which gives rise to the charge to be 
addressed in the third objection. 
In sum, the presence of philosophers in the clinical setting can be 
instructive for both philosophers and clinicians, raising the degree of 
professional awareness of principles. The philosopher also gains the 
necessary clinical understanding over the years to comment on cases 
which represent difficult ethical dilemmas, contribute to hospital 
policy, and teach and write on medical ethics issues with respect for 
medical realities. In teaching, philosophers can help prepare a genera-
tion of medical students in the principles of philosophical ethics and 
process of moral reasoning which are necessary for an advanced stage 
of reflective clinical performance and moral decision-making, a 
correlation which Sheehan et al. have found among residents. 37 
Finally, the patient benefits from a greater facility in the health care 
team for a clear discussion of the moral values in their case, and from 
a greater ability among students and residents to handle the complex 
of values in a morally sophisticated way. Needless to say, improved 
levels of moral reasoning do not guarantee an ethical decision. But 
they do lead to improved clinical performance. 
Sheehan's study is one of the first to offer hard evidence that 
indicators of clinical performance used to evaluate residents are 
directly affected by medical ethics training. There were 18 indicators 
based on work by Cook, Margolis, Elstein and Lindenfield.38 These 
indicators included: admits mistakes, works well with others, aware of 
own limits, compassionate, relates well to patients, medical knowl-
edge, clinical judgment, accepts responsibility, seeks consultations, 
empathy, and responds well to emergencies. Sheehan et al. found that 
"the very highest level of clinical performance is rarely achieved by 
those who remain at a low level of moral thought" (p. 401). Of 
course, no claim can be made that the medical ethics training makes 
physicians more ethical. 
In the clinical context, the philosopher is accountable to the man-
aging physician. Perhaps the best way to formalize this accountability 
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and the duties of philosophers as part of a health care team is to 
establish an ethics advisory service. The partnership between philos-
opher and clinician is institutionally recognized. The University of 
Tennessee advisory service is officially approved by St. Jude Hospital, 
the Veterans' Administration Hospital, four units of the City of 
Memphis Hospital, and the University Hospital. The advisory service 
functions like a consultation. There are three functions. First, we offer 
advice to the managing physician regarding difficult cases. In the past 
few months we have been asked for advice, in some cases in the chart, 
regarding the termination of treatment for a child with cancer, a dis-
pute among physicians regarding the use of a respirator, and the 
extent of care for an aged alcoholic. In some services, residents flag 
cases which may present ethical difficulties. Second, we help develop 
hospital policy regarding such things as research on children. Third, we 
assist physicians in their obligation to teach medical students the 
: , requirement of moral judgment as it occurs inherently in medical 
judgment, by accompanying them on rounds in six specialties. 
/ 
Ingelfinger's objection is answered, therefore, as follows. Improved 
patient care can be the result of clinical medical ethics if one takes 
patient care to be broader than cure of organic disease. Medicine 
involves ethics in its decisions for patients. Improved reflection on 
ethics, facility with language, and moral reasoning can be expected 
from inviting philosophers to be clinically based educators and consul-
tants. These improvements have a direct impact on the quality of 
patient care. 
2) Character 
The second major objection to a clinical medical ethics stems from 
a notion that students imbibe moral character necessary for ethical 
judgments from great teachers. McKee 39 has raised this objection to 
the need for teaching ethics at the bedside originally presented by 
Pellegrin040 and Siegler.41 
There is little doubt that great teachers have a profound effect on 
students, as the latter note in their response to McKee.42 However, it 
should be noted that the major teachers of medical students in med-
ical centers are the residents and interns, from whom students learn to 
manage their time, categorize patients, and make medical decisions. 
Only rarely do students encounter the kind of great teachers McKee 
envisions. 
In addition, students most frequently do their clerkships in a hos-
pital environment in which clinical indicators are emphasized to the 
detriment of other values of the patient. Carlton's sociological study 
demonstrated that unless ethics is clinically reinforced, earlier courses 
in the curriculum will have no effect against the "professionalization 
of judgment."43 If, as I have argued, ethics is an inherent feature of 
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medical decision-making, then clinical reinforcement of this aspect of 
medicine is essentia1.44 
To be sure, great teachers can and do employ this reinforcement. 
My experience reveals, however, that a majority of medical educators 
retains an interest in medical ethics, but either do not feel comfortable 
enough with the language to teach it explicitly, or do not have time to 
keep current with the literature in the field. Then, too, some special-
ists seem totally unaware of the moral dimensions of the cases they 
attend, just as they seem unaware of the economic dimensions of their 
decisions. Students often raise questions which they have trouble 
fielding. Most attending physicians seem to welcome the medical 
ethics faculty on rounds because of their familiarity with clinical real-
ities and with the medical ethics literature, albeit under the conditions 
of consultation already discussed. 
These comments do not address McKee's major contention, how-
ever. He seems not only to hold that ethics is learned by example and 
not didactics, but also questions whether one can teach ethics at all. In 
this regard he has confused moral character with the teaching of 
ethics. Moral character and professional integrity are taught. Each year 
medical schools certify the latter and hopefully attest to the former. 
Example is a powerful means of encouraging such moral character. 
However, didactic teaching of the humane sciences is also a means, as 
recent studies on the use of Kohlberg's stages of moral development in 
the classroom show.45 
Clearly, McKee interprets ethics to mean moral character. They are 
not synonymous. Ethics is a discipline in its own right, a discipline of 
reasoning about ethical principles and moral practices. Medical ethics 
should be considered both a branch of ethics and a branch of medi-
cine. In the former guise, it is a branch of applied ethics in which the 
theories and axioms of ethics are applied to medical dilemmas. In the 
latter guise, medical ethics is a critical reflection on the moral norms 
arising from the practice of medicine and a study of their reconcilia-
tion with patient and society's values.46 In both respects medical 
ethics can be taught. 
3) Sell-Out 
The final major objection against a clinically based medical ethics 
comes from moral thinkers. It is levelled against those who "sell-out" 
their discipline by making recommendations and watering down phil-
osophical discussions. We have also been accused of siding too much 
with physicians we have come to respect. 
Clearly, philosophers in a clinical setting must maintain an objec-
tivity required by their own discipline. Otherwise what they offer 
would be easily obtained from a coterie of admirers. But the objection 
that philosophers "sell out" their discipline by becoming practical and 
resolution-oriented is wholly without merit. 
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The greatest moral thinkers - Aristotle, Kant, Mill, Dewey - occu-
pied their time by addressing real moral issues. They did not play 
crossword puzzles with words and distinctions. By ensuring that medi-
cal ethics keeps its feet, waist, chest and head in the realities of the 
clinical setting, the partnership between medicine and ethics has a 
decent chance to establish an equivalent greatness. 
Roles of Clinical Philosophers 
Possible functions for clinical philosophers in medical ethics were 
suggested in the previous section. However, the functions were offered 
from the perspective of consultation and education objectives. In this 
section I will briefly describe activities in which philosophers in the 
clinical setting engage. These are taken from my own experience and 
that of fellow faculty so occupied. I have identified at least eight 
activities. 
1) Listening: Presence in the clinical setting allows us to listen to 
clinicians express their ethical concerns about a case as they develop. 
There is usually a cathartic moment after which initial reservations of 
the clinician are overcome, and after which he or she begins to develop 
a professional bond with the philosopher, encouraging the latter to 
consider a number of further problems for joint exploration . Many 
clinicians have explicitly stated that they prefer this bond to consults 
with chaplains or the social scientists. But this may only be a matter 
of taste and intellectual stimulation. 
2) Analyzing Intuitions: I find that intuitions about the right course 
of action in a case are often expressed. These are analyzed and crit-
ically examined, usually after the catharsis mentioned in 1). The 
result of such analysis is greater awareness of the role of feelings, 
character, and professional style on the part of the physician as these 
roles enter clinical judgment. These are further separated from the 
ethical judgment in the case so that they may not be misconstrued for 
moral rules. 
3) Reconciling Accounts of Case: Incredibly, I find that the clinical 
philosopher, as an arm of the managing physician, often has a clearer 
picture of a difficult case than many of the players in it, the patient, 
the house staff, the nurses, and so on. Much of our time is spent 
pursuing leads, analyzing intuitions, and tracing third party statements 
("The student said that the nurse said that the patient was uncooper-
ative .. . "). This function occurs because we are usually called for con-
sultation on a difficult case which, at the very least, involves clashes in 
values and corresponding complex emotional content. 
N one of the first three functions are specifically those of an 
ethicist. Anyone called in on a case would encounter them . The rest 
are specific to ethicists. 
4) Sketch Ethical Landscape: After the first three activities are 
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accomplished to some extent, the clinical philosopher begins to sketch 
the ethical landscape. It is not appropriate at this point to insist on 
one or another ethical theory. This function can best be understood as 
an initial description of the ethical parameters of a case. Without 
sufficient clinical experiences, philosophers often neglect the medical 
and institutional data important for this sketch. 
5) Isolation of the Mujor Ethical Issues: This function establishes 
the ethical import of a case. It usually occurs when those involved are 
able to state that the case is one of consent, or autonomy, or the 
doctor's duty, or some other classification which aids in the discussion 
by eliminating extraneous issues. Often, at this stage, the clinical phil-
osopher will distinguish the ethical issues from those which are legal or 
economic. 
6) Identifying and Ranking Values: Assisting those involved in the 
case usually involves a struggle to wrestle with all the conflicting 
values. Here the philosopher can greatly aid the professionals who often 
lack the skills to sort out and rank these values. "Which should come 
first: the patient request or my duty?" "The state law says that I have 
to have cessation of total brain function, but it seems inhumane to 
keep him alive when others need his bed." In these two sentences are 
contained important professional, personal, legal, and ethical duties. 
How are they to be ranked? If the decision is made without some 
explicit ranking of the values, I call it a knee-jerk decision, most often 
colored by emotions or the last person with whom one talked. Rank-
ing requires ethical dialogue. It also requires the next step. 
7) Provide Some Theory of Ranking: Reasons are given in the sixth 
function for ranking certain values above others, and so reaching a 
decision. These reasons are actually statements of ethical principle 
which for personal and professional reasons should bear some consis-
tent stamp over the course of the years. The theory of ranking a 
philosopher can contribute, then, directly bears on decisions to be 
made by the managing physician. I find that if all the other functions 
have been properly carried out, this theory of moral weight to be 
given to conflicting values most often reflects a joint decision in the 
case, or at least reflects an ethically justifiable claim by the physician 
for his or her decision. 
Experience with this function can then lead the philosopher as 
educator to develop a process of moral reasoning to be taught the 
medical students, so that the process of ranking values and giving 
reasons for this ranking can be the basis of an educational program. We 
call ours an "Ethical Workup." 47 Focus on the process has the merit 
of providing the structure of moral reasoning without a requirement 
to justify one's decisions using any particular moral theory. 
8) Making Policy Recommendations: Certain problems occur fre-
quently enough to warrant the development of hospital or institu-
tional policy. Resuscitation guidelines are just one example. These 
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policies do not eliminate the moral reasoning process just described 
for each individual case.48 But they do attempt to develop general 
guidelines, like those protecting human subjects in research, which 
help clinicians map the moral territory of a case more quickly, because 
some of the reasons in 6) and the theory in 7) have been discussed 
ahead of time. It is, after all, the mark of educated persons to antici-
pate their future moral quandaries from their past experience. I find 
that this function is most often fulfilled in joint research undertaken 
by the philosopher with clinicians, perhaps because the philosopher is 
disposed to the realm of generalization rather than particulars. 
These functions are not meant to be exhaustive. In fact they do not 
include interest philosophers have gained from medical practice in 
developing a philosophy of medicine. But they do show, I think, how 
inviting philosophers to function clinically can ultimately benefit the 
level and structure of moral decisions in medicine, and therefore, how 
clinical medical ethics can improve the quality of health care. 
REFERENCES 
1. Ingelfinger, F . J., "The Unethical in Medical Ethics," Annals of Internal 
Medicine, 83 (1975), pp. 264-269. 
2. Shelton, G. P. , " Victory for Medical Residents," Forum on Medicine, 1 
(July, 1978), pp. 14, 15. 
3. MacIntyre, A., "How Virtues Become Vices," Evaluations and Explanation 
in the Biomedical Sciences, ed . by H. T. Engelhardt and S. Spicker (Boston : D. 
Reidel, 1975), pp. 97-112. 
4 . MacIntyre, A., "Patients as Agents," Philosophical Medical Ethics: Its 
Na ture and Significance, ed. by H. T. Engelhardt and S . Spicker (Boston: D. 
Reidel, 1977), pp . 197-212. 
5. Hare, R. , "Medical Ethics: Can the Moral Philosopher Help?" ibid., pp. 
49-6l. 
6. Morgenbesser, S., "Experimentation and Consent: A Note," ibid., pp. 
97-110. 
7. Callahan, D., "The Emergence of Bioethics," Science, Ethics and Medicine, 
ed. by H. T . Engelhardt and D. Callahan (Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y . : Hastings 
Center, 1976), pp. x-xxvi. 
8. Marquis, D. , "Medical Ethics: Danger or Help to Clinicians?" Dialogue: A 
Kansas Journal of Health Concerns, 3 (Dec., 1976), pp. 36-38 . 
9. McKee, F. W., "Teaching Medical Ethics: Letter to the Editor, " Journal of 
the American Medical Association, 241 (1979), p. 27. 
10. Siegler, M., "A Legacy of Osler: Teaching Clinical Ethics at the Bedside," 
Journal of the American Medical Association, 239 (1978), pp. 951-956. 
11. Siegler, M. and Pellegrino, E. D., "In Reply to F. W. McKee," Journal of 
the American Medical Association, 241 (1979), pp. 27,28. 
12. Pellegrino, E. D., "Ethics and the Moment of Clinical Truth," Journal of 
the American Medical Association, 239 (1978), pp. 960, 96l. 
13. Jonsen, A., "Ethics as Immunotherapy," Forum on Medicine, 1 (Oct., 
1978), pp. 50-52. 
14. Siegler, "A Legacy of Osler," op. cit. 
15. Siegler and Pellegrino, "In Reply to F. W. McKee," op. cit. 
16. Jonsen, op. cit. 
August, 1982 275 
17. MacIntyre, "How Virtues Become Vices," op. cit. 
18. MacIntyre, "Patients as Agents," op. cit. 
19. Hare, op. cit. 
20 . Morgenbesser, op. cit. 
21. Marquis, op. cit. 
22. Ingelfinger, op. cit. 
23. Shelton , op. cit. 
24. Sidel , V. , "The Philosopher in the Hospital: Philosophy in Medicine and 
Philosophy of Medicine," Philosophers in Medical Centers, ed. by W. Ruddick 
(New York: Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1980), pp. 13-16. 
25. McElhinney, T., ed., Human Values and Teaching Programs (Philadelphia: 
Society for Health and Human Values, 1976). This volume will be updated soon. }, 
26. Ingelfinger, op. cit. 
27. Pellegrino, E . D. and Thomasma, D. C., A Philosophical Basis of Medical 
Practice: Toward a Philosophy and Ethics of the Healing Profession (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1981), chap. 6. 
28. Ruddick, W. , "How Can Doctors and Philosophers Work Together?" Phil-
osophers in Medical Centers, ed. by W. Ruddick (New York: Society for Philos-
ophy and Public Affairs, 1980), pp. 1-12. 
29. Ackerman, T. , "What Bioethics Should Be," Journal of Medicine and Phil-
osophy, 5 (Sept., 1980), pp. 260-275. 
30. Callahan, D., "Shattuck Lecture: Contemporary Biomedical Ethics," New 
England Journal of Medicine, 302 (1980), pp. 1228-1231. 
31. Thomasma, D. C., "The Possibility of a Normative Medical Ethics," Journal 
of Medical Ethics, 6 (Dec., 1980), pp. 190-196. 
32. Thomasma, D. C. and Pellegrino, E. D., "Philosophy of Medicine as Source 
for Medical Ethics," Metamedicine, 2 (1981), pp. 5-11. 
33. Clouser, K. D. , "Medical Ethics: Some Uses, Abuses and Limitations," 
Arizona Medicine, 33 (1976), pp. 44-49. 
34. Pellegrino and Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis, op. cit. 
35. Ruddick, op. cit. 
36. Abrams, N. and Buckner, M., "Philosophy in a Medical School: Getting 
Established," Philosophers in Medical Centers, ed. by W. Ruddick (New York: 
Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1980), pp. 50-67 . 
37. Sheehan, T. J .; Husted, S.; Candee, D .. ; Cook, C. D.; and Bargen, M., "Moral 
Judgment as a Predictor of Clinical Performance," Evaluation and the Health 
Professions, 3 (Dec., 1980), pp. 393-404 . 
38. Ibid., pp. 396-398. 
39. Siegler and Pellegrino, "In Reply to F. W. McKee," op. cit. 
40. Pellegrino, "Ethics and the Moment of Clinical Truth," op. cit. 
41. Siegler, "A Legacy of Osler," op. cit. 
42. Siegler and Pellegrino, "In Reply to F. W. McKee," op. cit. 
43 . Carlton, W., "In Our Professional Opinion .. . ," The Primacy of Clinical 
Judgment over Moral Choice (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1978). 
44. Thomasma, D. C., "Assessing the Dialogue Between Medicine and Philos-
ophy," Forum on Medicine, 3 (Dec., 1980), pp. 787-789,812. 
45. Goldman and Arbuthnot, "Teaching Medical Ethics: The Cognitive-Devel-
opmental Approach ," Journal of Medical Ethics, 5 (1979), pp. 170-181. 
46. Thomasma, D. C., "The Possibility of a Normative Medical Ethics," Journal 
of Medicine and Philosophy, 5 (Sept., 1980), pp. 249-259. 
47 . Thomasma, D. C., "Training in Medical Ethics: An Ethical Workup," 
Forum on Medicine, 1 (Dec., 1978), pp. 33-36. 
48. Thomasma, D. C., "Decision to Use the Respirator: Moral Policy," 
Bioethics Quarterly, 2, no. 4 (Winter, 1980), pp. 229-236. 
276 Linacre Quarterly 
